During late July of 1990 Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq, built up his military forces on the border with Kuwait. At 1:00 a.m. on 02 August 1990, three Iraqi divisions of the elite Republican Guard rolled over the border. Resistance was nearly non-existent. The Guard reached the outskirts of the capital, Kuwait City, a mere four and a half hours later. The frontal assault was supported by an airborne special forces division attack directly on Kuwait City itself. Saddam proclaimed his annexation of Kuwait, built up his forces, and waited to see what the world would say and do about his fait accompli. The Iraqis stopped short of Saudi Arabia and dug themselves in along the border . The Americans built up their forces while the Iraqis continued to consolidate their positions. The United Nations quickly imposed economic sanctions whilst he US sought support from its NATO allies for more tangible military aid. The British Government were the first to respond and ordered the deployment of Jaguar aircraft to Thumrait (Oman) and the Tornado aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This deployment signaled the start of Operation Granby. UKMAMS were involved from the outset, establishing a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, and two Forward Operating Bases (FOB's); one in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the other in Thumrait, Oman...
On 9th August, 1990, 5 full UKMAMS teams, complete with engineering support and field equipment, deployed to RAF Akrotiri to await confirmation of the final locations of the FOB's. The plan was to keep two teams at Akrotiri to reinforce the resident movements squadron, and send three teams forward to man the FOB's. The first flying squadron to deploy was a Tornado squadron which was on exercise in Cyprus at the outbreak of hostilities. As planned, two teams assisted with the preparation of ground support equipment into chalk loads whilst the other three teams were to go forward to Dhahran. The first team departed Cyprus for Dhahran, taking with them sufficient equipment for 72 hours of unsupported operations, which included full nuclear, biological and chemical warfare protection gear. The other two teams arrived the next day. Within two days the first Tornado squadron was fully deployed in-theatre. The working conditions were appalling. The teams, working in temperatures of plus 40ºC handled both C-130 and VC-10 aircraft mainly by hand owing to a shortage of the requisite handling aids and aircraft role equipment. Once this initial deployment was complete, two teams were returned to Cyprus to await further tasking. The remaining team found working space in the offices of the Royal Saudi Air Force and domestic succour in the British Aerospace compound in the nearby town of Al Khobar. On 12th August the decision was taken to deploy 6 Squadron (Jaguars) from RAF Colitshall to the 2nd FOB at Thumrait. A team was deployed from Lyneham to Coltishall to assist the station mobility personnel in the preparation and loading of the squadron to transport aircraft. In the meantime, two UKMAMS teams were deployed to Thumrait to establish an airhead and prepare for the reception of the Jaguars. A third UKMAMS team was deployed from Akrotiri. The Thumrait detachment were kept on constant alert for fear of a Yemeni attack, as the Yemenis became progressively more pro-Iraq. The teams were also denied any form of accommodation and had only limited access to an international telephone. The reception of the Jaguars proceeded on schedule despite a multitude of problems. The aircraft handling area was very small and inevitably it was very congested. A USAF Aerial Port Squadron helped enormously with the loan of equipment and facilities. After three days, a mobile catering support unit was deployed from the UK and for the first time the teams were able to enjoy well prepared nourishment. The positioning of the Jaguars at Thumrait was by and large a political move and negotiations were under way to move them closer to Kuwait. The logical place for the Jaguars would be Bahrain, an independent archipelago of islands halfway up the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain has an enviable history that includes the acquisition of a former British military airport, Muharraq. There was also an RAF presence in the shape of a flight lieutenant movements liaison officer (RAFLO), normally ex-UKMAMS the current officer was Richard "Foggy" Fogden. A MAMS team were positioned in Bahrain on 26th August 1990 to see in a Tornado squadron. The team consisted of 18 men and so were able to work two shifts giving 24 hours coverage. Whist the MAMS detachment had a limited quantity of its own handling equipment and given the enormous volume of military stores pouring in, they were heavily reliant on Gulf Air and the Bahrain Airport Services to assist in the offloading of our aircraft. On a more domestic note, the team were housed in an air conditioned hut on the edge of the pan and when they were not working they were housed in the Bahrain Hilton Hotel. The inbound aircraft loads of Tornado equipment started to arrive on 26th August at such a rate that a reinforcement of 6 personnel from Lyneham had to be flown in. The operation went on continuously for 48 hours while the Tornado squadron personnel worked diligently to sort out the supplies and clear up the backlog from the arrival area. By 6th September the bulk of the Tornado equipment was in position and the workload was reduced sufficiently so that a 6 man MAMS team was all that was required in Bahrain to handle the re-supply aircraft. Further down the Arabian Gulf another UKMAMS detachment was deployed to an airfield at Seeb in Muscat. The team were there to receive the three Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft and four VC-10 in-flight refueling tankers that were assigned to that base. Once in position with all of their ground equipment the team remained there to handle the aircraft ground crew rotation and spares resupply. Living and working conditions were relatively good at Seeb. The MAMS detachment commander had access to the Nimrod Operations Centre which was very well furnished with communications equipment, including a fax machine which had the added advantage of being secure. Seeb is blessed with a number of quite excellent hotels and in due course the Hercules crews became aware of this and persuaded HQ Strike Command that this was the place to "slip". On long flights, where crews cannot be expected to complete the whole trip at one time, there are two options; firstly you can night stop the whole flight to rest the crew, or secondly you can speed things up by pre-positioning a fresh crew to take the flight over - this latter practice is known as "slipping". The task of managing the s\lip crews fell to the resident MAMS team leader. Another UKMAMS team was deployed to the United Arab Emirates in support of the resupply of Royal Navy ships that were using the ports of Jebel Ali and Rashid. Rather than using the rather plush facilities at Dubai International Airport, the resupply aircraft were tasked into the military fighter base at Minhad, some 50 kilometres from the ports. Minhad was not ideally suited to the reception of transport aircraft and there were no facilities for larges volumes of inbound freight. A four man MAMS team were initially deployed to handle the inbound freighters and the local military worked in coercion with them, providing trucks and drivers as required. Elements of the USAF arrived soon after, bringing with them all of the required freight handling equipment, to be followed very closely by Royal Navy store men which took the pressure off of the MAMS team. The freighter aircrews began slipping at Minhad which now fell under MAMS managerial responsibility, while they had the added task of logistical support for a rather large Army exercise in the area. Meanwhile, back in the UK, the movements staff at Lyneham were placed on a three shift system in order to free up the fourth shift for reinforcement of the mobile MAMS teams. Many of the various combat units despatched to the Gulf had previously been prepared and loaded by the re-employed shift personnel and not the regular MAMS teams. These contingency teams spent a particularly hard two months moving around the UK and Germany loading out flying squadrons and their support equipment to their predetermined Gulf locations. On one such task, at Coltishall, the MAMS team worked solidly for 36 hours with only a 30 minute tea break midway through the flow. Straight after this, the team (all from C Shift) were immediately sent to RAF Honington where they deployed RAF Regiment personnel and their Rapier AA equipment to the Gulf. Movements staff at this time were so hard pressed that the movements auxiliaries of No. 4624 Squadron were brought in to lend a hand on weekends. By the end of the initial deployment, the teams had loaded over 320 Hercules sorties from Coltishall, Honington, Leuchars, Wittering, Wyton, Kinloss, Coningsby and Bruggen. All flights en-route to the Gulf were staged through RAF Akrotiri - an additional 35 movements personnel were drafted into Akrotiri and this became a major point of contention as the aircraft were already fully loaded and didn't require any movements input apart from the normal in-transit handling procedure. By the end of September, the initial forces of the alliance were deployed and ready to defend against possible Iraqi aggression, which whilst unlikely couldn't be ruled out. The United Nations made repeated calls on the Iraqis to leave Kuwait, but the Iraqis no longer recognized Kuwait as an independent state so they chose not to. Sanctions were imposed on the Iraqis and the prospect of war seemed more and more likely. The Iraqis were playing a waiting game for good reason. The alliance of Arab Islamic states with the two Great Satans (the British and the Americans) against a brother Arab state was alarming to say the least and Iraq was hoping for both Arab and domestic Western opinion to turn against the prospect of war which would produce no tangible benefit to themselves. This proved to be a huge miscalculation and allowed the British to deploy more Tornado aircraft and 7 Armoured Brigade to the Saudi desert. This of course was to greatly increase the workload of UKMAMS.
In late September a reconnaissance team went to the desert airbase at Tabuk. It was deemed unsuitable for our operations owing to poor sanitary conditions, non- existent aircraft handling equipment and unsatisfactory accommodations. Despite the problems, Tabuk was selected to be the next location for the GR1 Tornados from both the UK and RAF Germany squadrons. On 24th September a 6 man UKMAMS team (including the flight commander, OC Mobile), deployed to Tabuk with the minimum required air cargo handling equipment to set up a reception airhead. In addition to the Tornado support equipment, large quantities of JP233 runway denial weapons were loaded outbound to be in place by 9th October. The original intent was to use the Hercules and VC-10 aircraft to load the weapons, but the sheer volume would have made the aircraft movements untenable. Instead the Airlift Coordination Cell were persuaded to use RAF TriStars with their greater carrying capacity. A TriStar is a big aircraft whose only entrances are at quite a distance above ground level - a specialised vehicle would be required to offload the aircraft, which was not available at Tabuk. The UKMAMS team were able to overcome this problem by "borrowing" one from the civil airport at Taif and transporting it back to Tabuk in a single Hercules sortie. Despite many problems caused by poor communications and vehicle unservicability, the deployment of the Tornados to Tabuk finished one day ahead of schedule. This was in no small part due to the cooperation of the USAF 5th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron who provided invaluable assistance throughout the operation.
Al Jubail was open for business on 28th September when it started to receive the brigades' airportable equipment, troops and support elements. The heavy equipment including tanks and personnel carriers were brought in by sea to the port. The airhead became the focal point for many units en-route to the desert; 33 Field Hospital, support helicopter detachments and elements of the Tactical Supply Wing were just some that passed through Al Jubail. Inevitably the airfield was also destined to become a vital link in the re-supply of the ground forces. The facilities were basic and the aircraft handling area was small. The whole of the British, American and Saudi forces shared just one international telephone. Once again, the MAMS team had insufficient ACHE for what was expected of them, but the American forces were able to provide help in this regard. An extra team was brought in and in just one month alone UKMAMS handled 11,000 passengers and 1,400,000 lbs of freight. With the system running smoothly, albeit at full stretch, a change in policy was inevitable. ALCC in conjunction with HQ British Forces Middle East, initiated the hub & spoke concept of re-supply. The Gulf hub was located at King Khalid international airport in Riyadh and every other airhead was relegated to being a spoke. From now on freight was to be aggregated at Brize Norton and flown to Riyadh where it would be sorted into destination loads and then flown out to the spokes the following day on special in-theatre Hercules aircraft. To protect the delivery operation, up to 60 fighter aircraft were overhead on Combat Air Patrol at any given time.
During this period of hectic activity the order was received to move the Jaguar force from Thumrait to Bahrain. Once again Lyneham sent reinforcements to help with this move. The USAF offered manpower and airframes to help our overstretched forces and we requested 65 C-130 sorties of them. This they provided whilst the RAF carried out 16 sorties. Such was the level of help that the entire Jaguar force was settled into Bahrain within 5 days. Meanwhile, back at Lyneham, the pressure was easing. Now that Brize Norton was involved in the operation, a lot of the routine re-supply freight went through their portals. This change in workload allocations provided a sudden glut of manpower and Lyneham was able to bring its' base shift system back up to 70% of their establishment. Now they were able to tackle the large backlog of cargo that had accumulated over the preceding months - at one point all of the car parks in Lyneham were full of freight. By mid-November it was apparent that there would have to be a ground war to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait and the Western allies were going to have to start it. The Americans doubled their forces in-theatre and the British followed suit with the mobilization of our 4th Armoured Brigade who were to join the 7th and become the 1st Armoured Division. Once again the detachment at Al Jubail went into overdrive requiring, and receiving, a doubling of its manpower. Riyadh also increased their detachment size in anticipation of the increased workload.
Iraq was given an ultimatum to remove themselves from Kuwait by 15th January. Load after load of tank tracks, spare engines and gear boxes were flown into theatre. A large variety of aircraft were gradually being employed by the MoD to take the pressure off of our own aircraft and crews. Various Boeing 707's with a myriad of nationalities started arriving. Heavy Lift were using their Belfast's and Guppies, Kuwait Airlines were operating their remaining Boeing 747 as a shuttle and numerous jobbing DC8's starting arriving from the USA. This increased the pressure on UKMAMS as they were now unloading a greater number and wider variety of aircraft than ever before. The actual war was a short lived event, lasting only a matter of weeks. One month of intensive bombing followed by a week-long land campaign was sufficient to result in the "Mother of all Capitulations" as Saddam Hussein had predicted earlier on. During the hostilities, the MAMS teams at all of the airheads were continuing to receive supplies and making preparations for the evacuation of large numbers of casualties. Supplies were also being delivered into rough desert airstrips and two MAMS teams were tasked forward to the battle area to form FOB's. Immediately before the start of operations against the Iraqis, the Air Commander in Riyadh announced that there would no longer be any roulement of personnel. This decision was very unpopular amongst those who just spent 6 months in the desert. With the ability to rotate and reinforce its teams removed, UKMAMS flexibility in-theatre was no longer there and the viewpoint was that a sustained operation would not be viable.
When the operation was starting to wind up, the auxiliary movers from Brize Norton were mobilized. These much-needed reinforcements were employed on both mobile and base duties and certainly proved their worth. The mobilization of the auxiliaries was a good decision, albeit a little late after their regular counterparts had been through some of their most difficult times. The auxiliaries were not to be under employed as the work of UKMAMS was set to increase still further when the recovery of the British assets in the Gulf was soon to begin.
Throughout the recovery, thousands of soldiers transited back to the UK through RAF Lyneham. There was no fanfare or welcoming committee, instead, after going through HM Customs arrivals procedures, they were unceremoniously herded onto waiting coaches. The recovery was a busy, if uneventful, time for the MAMS teams who departed from Dhahran on the last TriStar out in mid-April. Elements of UKMAMS remained in Al Jubail to support the dwindling Army operations and help with the continued recovery of equipment and personnel still filtering back. Without a doubt the personnel of UKMAMS, regardless of working from base or deployed areas, made an enormous contribution to the success of Operation Granby. At all times they acquitted themselves with professionalism and selflessness. In the face of little equipment or sympathetic understanding of their role or problems, they all demonstrated great ingenuity and flexibility. The squadron is justifiably proud of its motto and traditions which were so comprehensively upheld. ______________________________________________
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